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Many agricultural commodities have industry-funded generic promotion and/or research 
(“checkoff”) programs designed to improve the economic performance of producers.  To determine the 
effectiveness of these programs, the net benefits to producers attributable to activities funded by the 
checkoff must be separated from those due to other factors influencing commodity markets.  One such 
factor that is very important in many agricultural commodity markets is the effect of government 
programs.  However, studies evaluating the returns to checkoff programs often do not explicitly discuss 
the impact of pre-existing distortions caused by federal farm programs.  Because the distortions caused by 
farm programs can be quite large, this omission can lead to seriously biased estimates of the returns to the 
checkoff programs.  In this study, we develop a model that captures the influence of two Federal 
programs (loan deficiency payments to farmers and subsidies to consuming mills) on the estimated 
returns to the Cotton Research and Promotion Program.  Using an econometrically estimated model of the 
U.S. cotton market, we find that the program interaction effects have a large impact on checkoff program 
returns. 
 1.  Introduction and Background 
Agricultural commodity markets are a labyrinth of complex subsidies and other distortions on 
both the demand and supply sides of the market.  Government programs that impact the production of 
agricultural products have been in existence in various forms since the 1930s, when they were introduced 
in response to sharp declines in farm product prices.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is required to provide assistance to specified agricultural 
commodities with three primary objectives: support prices, supplement incomes, and manage supplies.  
Congress has devised a number of techniques for the CCC to employ in achieving these objectives, 
including nonrecourse loans, commodity purchases, deficiency payments (based on target prices), loan 
deficiency payments, acreage reduction programs, and marketing quotas, among others.  There are also 
numerous non-CCC farm production and marketing programs that influence agricultural commodity 
markets such as farm lending, soil and water conservation, and export assistance programs, as well as 
federally subsidized crop insurance.  In addition, there are programs that subsidize consumption of some 
agricultural commodities.  For instance, under the Step 2 marketing provision for upland cotton, subsidy 
payments are made to exporters and domestic mill users of U.S. cotton when the U.S. price is sufficiently 
above the world price.   
In addition to the government programs described above, many agricultural commodities have 
industry-funded generic promotion and research (“checkoff”) programs that are designed to increase 
domestic and/or international demand for the commodity.  Some of the largest national checkoff 
programs are for beef, pork, dairy products, cotton, and eggs.  The impetus behind these programs from 
the producers’ standpoint is that they may be able to improve the economic performance of commodity 
producers.  In markets characterized by homogeneous commodities produced by numerous suppliers, 
there is little incentive for any individual producer to unilaterally fund commodity promotion or research.  
Recognizing this, producers of numerous agricultural commodities have chosen to impose an assessment 
on themselves to fund programs aimed at increasing the demand for the generic commodity and 
  1 increasing the profitability of all producers in the market.2  In addition to the national programs, there are 
state-level promotion and research programs for many commodities.  
Although producers presumably vote to institute checkoff programs because they anticipate 
receiving positive net benefits, it is possible that those benefits will not materialize.  Thus, checkoff 
program funders retain the right the vote the programs out of existence.  For instance, programs for 
pecans, limes, and fresh cut flowers and fresh cut greens were voted out of existence in 1993, 1995, and 
1997, respectively (USDA AMS, 2001).  In addition, the majority of pork producers that participated in 
an advisory referendum in 2000 voted to end the $50 million pork checkoff program, although that 
program continues to operate under a court settlement, subject to several changes, including a 
commitment to a future binding referendum.  For producers to make well-informed decisions concerning 
their support for the checkoff programs in which they participate, it is important to have accurate 
estimates of the net returns.   
However, many studies of the effectiveness of checkoff programs do not adequately incorporate 
the impacts of existing government policies.  In particular, the dampening effect of binding price supports 
on the gains to producers from generic promotion and research are not  
always accounted for (e.g., Capps et al., 1997; Lenz, Kaiser, and Chung, 1998; Pritchett, Liu, and Kaiser, 
1998).  However, the pre-existing distortions from government interventions can be quite large.  
Therefore, ignoring these distortions may lead to substantially inaccurate estimates of the changes in 
welfare associated with generic promotion and research.   
In this study, we examine these interaction effects for U.S. cotton, a commodity with a substantial 
checkoff program used to expand demand in a market that has recently been subject to large subsidies for 
producers as well as consuming textile mills.  We develop a model of the U.S. cotton market that captures 
                                                      
2The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized under the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996 to 
issue an order regarding promotion, research, and information activities for an agricultural commodity based on 
proposals submitted by industry representatives.  To determine whether the persons to be covered by the order are in 
favor, the order may provide for an initial referendum of persons subject to the assessment.  If there is not an initial 
referendum, then a referendum must be held within three years of the starting date of assessments.  The order will be 
suspended or terminated if it is not favored by persons voting in a referendum (Wright, 1996).  All of the Federal 
  2 the influence of Federal programs that may simultaneously affect both the demand for cotton and the 
supply of cotton on the estimated returns to generic cotton promotion and research.  The objective of this 
paper is to reveal the nature of these interaction effects and to empirically determine their magnitude.   
1.1  Cotton Research and Promotion Program 
Until the development of petroleum-derived synthetic fibers in the 1950s, cotton was unrivaled as 
the dominant fiber in clothing and home textiles in the U.S.  The introduction and rapid quality and cost 
improvement of polyester and nylon fibers led to a sustained decline in the demand for cotton for all uses 
beginning in about 1960.  By 1966, cotton’s decline had progressed to the point that Congress felt a need 
to intervene, eventually passing the Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966.  In passing the law, 
Congress reasoned that the inroads in the textile fiber market made by synthetic fibers were largely a 
result of research and promotion conducted by its makers (primarily large chemical firms).  Because 
individual cotton producers did not have the resources to perform these activities or the legal means to 
join together to fund such work, Congress provided a coordinating mechanism to enable producers to 
collectively engage in research and promotion.   
On December 31, 1966, USDA put into effect the Cotton Research and Promotion Order after a 
successful referendum of growers.  The Order required participating producers to pay a base assessment 
of $1 per bale of upland cotton.  In a 1976 referendum, U.S. producers voted to authorize collection of a 
supplemental assessment, not to exceed 1 percent, based on the value of the cotton.  The supplemental 
assessment was set at 0.4 percent in 1977, increased to 0.6 percent in 1985, and lowered to the current 
level of 0.5 percent in 1991.  Although the two-thirds vote required by the referendum assured broad 
support, any producer who did not wish to participate in the checkoff program could apply for a refund of 
all assessed amounts.   
The Cotton Research and Promotion Act was modified significantly in 1990, in an effort to boost 
its impact on the overall textile market.  Most notably, importers of textiles containing upland cotton were 
                                                                                                                                                                           
checkoff programs are overseen by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service to ensure the programs operate within 
Congressionally mandated rules of compliance.   
  3 to be subject to the same assessments as domestic producers.  Collection of assessments on imported 
cotton and the cotton content of imported textile and apparel products began in August 1992.  In addition, 
elimination of the refund provision made participation mandatory for all U.S. growers of upland cotton.  
These changes led to substantial increases in the value of assessments collected.  In 2000, producers and 
importers paid a total of just under $67 million in assessments.   
Beginning several years after implementation of the Cotton Research and Promotion Program 
(CRPP), funded by these assessments, cotton’s market share at U.S. mills leveled off after more than a 
decade of steep decline (see Figure 1).  Market share then rose sharply throughout the 1980s until the 
early 1990s.  While market share at U.S. mills has since declined by a few percentage points, U.S. 
consumption of cotton has continued to increase rapidly.  U.S. cotton consumption increased from 23.6 to 
34.6 pounds per capita and from 35.3 percent to 39.5 percent of all fibers consumed between 1990 and 
2000.3  This provides some compelling anecdotal evidence that the CRPP has been effective.  However, 
many other factors must be considered in evaluating the CRPP, one of which is the influence of 
government programs on the market for cotton.   
1.2  Federal Farm Programs for Cotton  
Beginning with the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1938, the government has 
attempted to support cotton growers’ incomes by restricting output and supporting domestic prices.  The 
Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, also called the “Freedom to Farm 
Act,” kept several of the long-standing loan and payments provisions but swept away a complicated set of 
price targets and acreage quotas that had been in place for decades.  The FAIR Act covers the period from 
1996 to 2002 and includes the following elements: marketing assistance (MA) loans, loan deficiency 
payments (LDPs), and agricultural marketing transition assistance (AMTA) payments.4  The FAIR Act 
                                                      
3The quantity of imported textile products nearly tripled during the 1990s, allowing cotton to increase its share of U.S. 
fiber consumption despite a lower share at U.S. mills by increasing the share of cotton in imports.   
4These payments are also known as production flexibility contracts (PFCs).   
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Source:  Textile Economics Bureau.  Textile Organon (serial).  Various issues.  New York:  Textile Economics Bureau.   
also includes a special three-step marketing provision to maintain competitiveness of U.S. cotton on 
world markets (USITC, 2001).   
The CCC has been offering nonrecourse MA loans to cotton growers since its founding in 1938.  
Farmers may request loans on any bales of cotton they have harvested and ginned, as long as they insure 
them and store them in a USDA-approved warehouse.  The loan rate is based on the lower of the adjusted 
world price (AWP) or 85 percent of the price received over the past 5 years but is guaranteed to be no 
lower than 50 cents per pound and no higher than 51.92 cents.5  If market prices were to rise during the 
term of the loan, the grower would be free to sell the cotton and repay the loan, plus fees and charges.  If 
the loan is not paid off within 10 months of the issue date, the grower defaults on the loan and the cotton 
is forfeited to the CCC.  As an alternative to placing cotton into the CCC loan program, growers can 
apply for a LDP, which allows them to sell their cotton on the market and receive a payment from the 
CCC for the difference between the loan rate and the AWP.  Growers can also use this provision to pay 
  5 off their MA loans at the AWP rather than at the loan rate.  The LDP option allows the producer to 
receive the benefits of the marketing loan program without having to take out and subsequently repay a 
commodity loan. 
To mitigate potential negative impacts of the price support programs on cotton exports and the 
domestic textile industry, a complicated three-step competitiveness process was also put in place by the 
FAIR Act.  Step 1 allows the Secretary of Agriculture to further reduce loan repayment rates if the AWP 
falls below 115 percent of the loan rate and the lowest U.S. Northern Europe6 price exceeds the Northern 
Europe7 price (known as the A Index).  Step 2 provides for payments to U.S. mills, marketers, and 
exporters when the U.S. price exceeds the A Index by more than 1.25 cents per pound for 4 consecutive 
weeks and the AWP does not exceed 134 percent of the U.S. loan rate.  These payments are equal to the 
difference between the U.S. price and the A Index minus 1.25 cents per pound.  The 1996 FAIR Act 
capped total expenditures for Step 2 during FY 1996-2002 at $701 million.  However, the cap was 
reached less than halfway through this period, in mid-December 1999 and payments could no longer be 
made.  The program was reinstated in October 1999 when the 2000 Appropriations Act removed the 
program’s expenditure cap.  Step 3 protects domestic cotton users by increasing cotton import quotas 
when the U.S. price (adjusted for Step 2 payments) exceeds the A Index by more than 1.25 cents per 
pound for 4 consecutive weeks.  
2. Conceptual  Model 
2.1  Model of the U.S. Cotton Market 
To assess the changes in supply and demand resulting from the CRPP, a structural model of the 
domestic cotton industry is developed.  The linkages between the relevant market levels must be included 
to ensure that all of the CRPP impacts are considered.  The framework for such a market linkage model is 
                                                                                                                                                                           
5From this base loan rate, a premium or discount is applied, depending on the region and cotton quality. 
6The U.S. Northern Europe price is the weekly (Friday-Thursday) average price quotation for the lowest priced U.S. 
upland cotton, as quoted for Middling (M) quality 1 3/32 inch fiber length cotton, delivered c.i.f. (cost, insurance, 
freight) to Northern Europe. 
7The Northern Europe price is the weekly average of world price quotes for the five lowest priced growths of upland (M 
1 3/32 inch) cotton delivered c.i.f. Northern Europe.   
  6 found in Piggott, Piggott, and Wright (1995); Wohlgenant (1993); and Wohlgenant and Clary (1993), 
among others.  The retail market consists primarily of the apparel market and the home furnishings 
market.  The textile market consists of intermediate textile producers and consumers in the U.S. and is the 
major demander of raw cotton.8  The structural market model for domestic cotton is defined as follows:9   
Qd
rd = Drd(Prd, Prm, Ag, Ab, Af, Zr)  
Retail demand for domestic cotton products  (1) 
Q s
rd = Srd(Prd, Ptd, Ptm, Wr)  
Retail supply of domestic cotton products  (2) 
Qd
td = Dtd(Prd, Ptd, Ptm, Wr)  
Derived demand for intermediate cotton textiles  (3) 
Qs
td = Std(Ptd, Ptm, Pcd, Pcf, Rt, Wt)  
Supply of intermediate cotton textiles  (4) 
Qd
fd = Dfd(Ptd, Ptm, Pcd, Pcf, Rt, Wt)  
U.S. demand for domestic raw cotton fiber  (5) 
Q s
fd = Sfd(Pcd, Ra, Wf)  
U.S. supply of raw cotton fiber  (6) 
Qd
fx = Dfx(Pcd, Pcf, Zx, Wm, Tf)  
Export demand for raw U.S. cotton fiber  (7) 
Ptm = MCtm(Pcd, Pcf, Wm)  
Price of imported textile products  (8) 
Ptd = MCtd(Pcd, Pcf, Wt)  
Price of domestic textile products  (9) 
Qd
rd = Q s
rd  




Textile market clearance  (11) 
                                                      
8The term “textiles” as used in this model includes all intermediate products that will be used as inputs into making 
apparel, home furnishings, or other retail products. 
9This model assumes a fixed-proportions marketing technology.  In other words, a unit of fiber input is combined with a 
fixed amount of “marketing” inputs to generate a unit of output.  We believe that this is a reasonable assumption for 
cotton product production, at least for the range of production levels being examined.  However, it does have 
somewhat different implications for producers compared with variable proportions technology.  Kinnucan, Xiao, and 
Yu (2000) show that if marketing technology is variable proportions, then research that reduces marketing costs can 
potentially result in a negative effect on producers.   
  7 Qd
fd + Qd
fx = Q s
fd    
Farm-level market clearance  (12) 
where Qk
ij represents quantities for which k denotes quantity supplied (s) or demanded (d); i denotes 
market level (retail [r], textile [t], or farm [f]); and j denotes domestic (d), export (x), or foreign (f).  In 
addition, Prd is the retail price for domestic cotton products, Prm is the retail price for imported cotton 
products, Ag is generic promotion expenditures for cotton, Ab is branded advertising expenditures for 
cotton, Af is advertising expenditures for man-made fibers, Zr is a vector of demand factors in the retail 
market other than advertising (e.g., income), Ptd is the price of domestic intermediate cotton textiles, Ptm 
is the price of imported intermediate cotton textiles, Wr is a vector of supply factors in the retail market 
(e.g., retail wages, energy costs), Pcd is the domestic price of cotton at the mill level (net of Step 2 
subsidies), Pcf is the price of foreign cotton fiber, Ra is agricultural cotton research expenditures (made by 
both Cotton Incorporated (CI), the legal entity that implements the research and promotion activities 
under the CRPP,  and public institutions funding cotton research), Rt is nonagricultural research 
expenditures made by CI, Wt is a vector of supply shifters for the cotton textile market (e.g., textile 
wages, energy costs), Wf is a vector of supply factors for cotton producers (e.g., input costs, prices of 
alternative crops), Zx is a vector of demand factors for export markets, Wm is a vector of supply factors 
for foreign cotton textiles, and Tf represents shifters of the supply of raw foreign cotton.10 
Because our emphasis is on raw cotton producers and that is the market level for which data are 
most readily available, partially reduced-form supply and demand equations at the farm level are 
estimated.  To estimate these equations while incorporating effects from the other levels of the market, the 
                                                      
10Both branded promotional expenditures for cotton-containing products and promotional expenditures for substitute 
products such as man-made fibers are important to consider and were part of our theoretical model.  However, in the 
final model estimated empirically, these variables are not included.  Promotional expenditures for man-made fibers 
were not included because no data were available.  Branded promotional expenditures were proxied using Levi 
Strauss expenditures, but their inclusion revealed no significant impact on the coefficient for CI promotion.  Because 
the available data series for these expenditures was shorter than for the other demand variables (and was available 
only quarterly rather than monthly for part of the series) and did not reveal significant interaction effects with CI 
promotion, they were dropped from the final model.   
  8 determinants of retail and intermediate textile demand are substituted into the farm-level demand 
equation.  This results in reduced-form equations for prices, which have the following form: 
Prd = Prd(Ptd, Ptm, Ag, Ab, Af, Wr, Zr), and  (13) 
Prm = Prm(Ptd, Ptm, Ag, Ab, Af, Wr, Zr). (14) 
Substituting (8) and (9) into equations (13) and (14) for Ptm and Ptd, respectively, and substituting (13) 
and (14) into (5) yields a partially reduced-form equation for domestic textile mill demand for 
domestically produced cotton: 
Qfd
d = Dfd(Pcd, Pcf, Ag, Ab, Af, Rt, Wr, Wt, Zr ). (15) 
In addition, we modeled the export demand for raw U.S. cotton as 
Qfx
d = Dfx(Pcd, Pcf, Wm, Zx, Tf ). (16) 
Domestic demand plus export demand gives us total demand for domestically produced cotton.   
In addition to a model of the demand for domestically produced cotton, a model of the domestic 
supply of cotton is developed so that we could simulate equilibrium price and quantity under different 
conditions.  Annual production of cotton depends on the expected effective price of cotton (i.e., the price 
producers expect to receive when they sell their output, adjusting for government programs) and other 
factors that shift the supply function (e.g., input costs).  Thus, the domestic supply of cotton is modeled as 
 Q fd
s = Sfd(EPcd, Ra, Wf) (17) 
where EPcd is the expected effective price of cotton.  An expected price is used because of the lag 
between planting, harvesting, and selling cotton.  It includes not only the market price expected by 
producers, but also the expected effects of government payments.  The higher the expected market price, 
the more producers are willing to supply, everything else being equal.  However, in addition to the effects 
of the market price, U.S. government price support programs for cotton may also influence cotton 
producers’ decisions.  When producers are anticipating government payments that vary with the quantity 
produced, the relevant supply price they face is the expected market price plus the expected government 
payment per unit.  
  9 2.2  Cotton Program-Induced Market Shocks 
 
Commodity research and promotion may lead to shifts in retail demand, production costs, and/or 
marketing costs.  It is expected that the activities performed under the CRPP will simultaneously cause 
each of these three types of shifts to occur in the domestic market for cotton.  This is because the CRPP 
engages in promotion designed to increase retail demand, research into fiber and textile quality that is 
aimed at increasing mill-level demand directly (because of reductions in the cost of processing cotton),11 
and agricultural research into methods of reducing production costs or increasing yields.12  In addition, 
there is a shift in the supply curve resulting from the assessment itself.  The assessment increases the cost 
of production, resulting in a decrease in supply, all else equal.  Because the assessment and the results of 
agricultural research shift the supply curve in opposite directions, the net shift of the supply curve 
depends on which effect is larger.   
The existence of federal farm programs greatly complicates the calculation of the effects of these 
shifts on price, consumption, and returns to producers.  Although the 1996 FAIR Act was ostensibly 
going to eliminate commodity price subsidies, they remain for cotton producers in the form of LDPs.  
Moreover, cotton demanders (mills) receive payments under the Step 2 program to cover the gap between 
the U.S. cotton price and the world cotton price.  Figure 2 provides a diagram of these interactions 
assuming an increase in demand due to the CRPP.13  
Panel (a) in Figure 2 represents the undistorted market solution.  Here supply and demand 
intercept without subsidies on either the demand side or the supply side.  A shift in the market demand 
induced by the CRPP will cause a rise in the market price from P *
m0 to P *
m1.  The shaded area (producer 
surplus) represents the return to producers.  
                                                      
11This research may also increase retail demand if the quality of retail products improves as a result of the research 
activities. 
12There is compelling empirical evidence that producers should not be indifferent to the type of shift being funded (i.e., 
it is important to separate the effects of promotion, agricultural research, and nonagricultural research because they 
may have very different returns to producers (Wohlgenant, 1993). 
13Supply shifts resulting from the CRPP are not shown in this diagram to simplify the graphs and focus on the demand 
effects of promotion and nonagricultural research, the areas where the majority of CRPP funds are allocated. 
  10Figure 2.  Farm Program Interactions 
The influence of U.S. farm programs such as the loan deficiency payment (LDP) system and Step 2 program greatly 














S21 : Step 2 payment after shift
S20 : Step 2 payment initial
(c)  Step 2 Program Effects
Pm   = Market Price = Supply Price
PW = World Price = Demand Price (Demanders are guaranteed
to pay world price + $0.0125)
(Shift Effects)
∆ PM is larger than it would be in a free market (∆ PM)








(d)  Combined Effects of LDP & Step 2
PS1 = PM1 + (PL - PW1)
PS0 = PM0 + (PL - PW0)





Ps   = Supply Price = PM & (PL - PW)
PW = Demand Price = World Price (Guaranteed + $0.0125—not depicted)
PM = "Market" Price, though it is neither a supply nor a demand price
PM* = Free market price
(Shift Effects)
∆ PS < ∆ PM, but ∆ PM vs ∆ PM* is an empirical issue














* Here Pm   = Market Price = Supplier Price = Demand Price
∆ PS = Producer Benefits from Demand Shift
(Ex Post LDP Payment to Farmers)
(Initial LDP Payment to Farmers)







PS1 = PM1 + (PL - PW)







PM = Market Price = Demand Price
PS = PM + (PL - PW) = Supply Price
PW = World Price, where PW = F (PM)
PL = LDP Rate (Fixed)
(Shift effects on producer price:)
∆ PS = (PS1 - PS0) = (PM1 - PM0) - (PW1 - PW0) = ∆ PM - ∆ PW
Since ∆ PW > 0, then ∆ PS < ∆ PM (Also LDP1, < LDP0)




Panel (b) introduces the effects of the LDP system.  If the adjusted world price (AWP) of cotton 
falls below the loan rate of 51.92 cents per pound, cotton growers are eligible for a supplemental payment 
equal to the difference between the loan rate and the AWP.  The total price received by the grower is 
equal to the price they receive in the market (PM) plus the supplemental payment (P
–
L – PW), where P
–
L is 
the loan rate and PW is the AWP.  The demand shift raises the U.S. market price from PM0 to PM1.  
However, the total price to suppliers will be less than PM1 if the loan rate is binding and the rise in the 
  11U.S. market price causes a corresponding rise in the AWP (thereby diminishing the supplemental 
payment to farmers).  If the relationship between the U.S. price and the world price is 1:1, then the rise in 
the world price causes a decline in the supplemental payment that, from the producer’s perspective, 
completely offsets the rise in the market price.  In this case, there would be no net benefit of the demand 
shift to producers.14  However, there are a number of reasons to expect that the U.S. market price and the 
AWP do not move in parallel fashion.  First of all, U.S. cotton is widely regarded to be of a superior  
quality and not perfectly substitutable with cotton from elsewhere in the world (thus they are not exactly 
the same commodity and may not receive the same price in the market).  There are also transportation 
costs to consider, which also keep U.S. prices from directly tracking the AWP.  To test for this 
empirically, we ran a price transmission regression of the AWP on the U.S. price and estimated a 
statistically significant price transmission parameter of 0.3.  This implies that a $1 change in the U.S. 
price will lead to a 30 cent change in the world price.  Thus, this feedback on the world price diminishes 
the benefit to producers of positive demand shifts when the loan rate is binding, but not enough to wipe 
out CRPP benefits entirely.   
Panel (c) illustrates the effects of the Step 2 program.  When the U.S. price is above the A Index 
price by at least 1.25 cents per pound for 4 consecutive weeks, U.S. mills, marketers, and exporters 
receive a supplemental payment to use U.S. cotton that is equal to the difference between the U.S. price 
and the A Index.  In this case, a CRPP-induced shift in U.S. demand raises the domestic market price.  If 
Step 2 is in effect, then demanders do not effectively pay the higher U.S. price; rather, they receive a 
higher supplemental Step 2 payment from the government.  By foregoing a negative demand response, 
U.S. prices increase more than they would without Step 2.  Therefore, this enhances the price benefits of 
the cotton program to U.S. producers.  The price transmission issue applies here as well.  The size of the 
Step 2 supplement is diminished in part by the corresponding rise in the world price.  We adjust for that 
using the price transmission parameter of 0.3 referenced above.   
                                                      
14We thank Dr. Henry Kinnucan for raising this point in his review of the first draft of a longer report on which this 
paper is based. 
  12It is possible for both the LDP and Step 2 programs to be in effect simultaneously.  The world 
price may be low enough to trigger LDP payments in the U.S., but the U.S. price may still be more than 
high enough above the world price to trigger the Step 2 payments.  This was, in fact, the case for much of 
1999 through 2001 and persists into 2002.  Panel (d) demonstrates how prices are determined when both 
programs are in effect.  Because the LDP tends to diminish the price benefits of the CRPP-induced 
demand shift and the Step 2 tends to enhance this effect, it is not possible to determine a priori whether 
the net interactive effects of the programs are positive or negative.  It is an empirical issue.  
3. Data 
Monthly data for the period January 1986 through December 2000 were used to estimate 
domestic mill demand and export demand for domestic cotton.  The quantity of domestic cotton 
consumed by domestic mills and the quantity exported were obtained from various issues of the USDA’s 
Cotton and Wool Outlook.  The prices used in the model were the price of cotton at the U.S. mill level, 
the A Index (foreign cotton price), and the prices of rayon and polyester.  These prices were all obtained 
from the National Cotton Council (2001) web site.  The mill price was adjusted for government subsidies 
by subtracting the average user certificate subsidy value for each month from the reported price.  Data on 
the monthly value of this subsidy for the use of domestic cotton were obtained from Cotton Incorporated 
(CI).  All prices obtained from the National Cotton Council were converted into raw fiber equivalent 
form.15  CI also provided monthly data on CRPP expenditures for advertising, nonagricultural research, 
and agricultural research expenditures for the period 1986 through 2000.   
The domestic demand model is estimated using per capita quantities.  To calculate these 
quantities and convert other variables to per capita terms, we collected monthly population data for the 
U.S. from the U.S. Census Bureau (2001).  We obtained the wage in the domestic textile industry and a 
monthly index of energy costs from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2001).  For the domestic 
                                                      
15More waste is associated with cotton fiber than with polyester or rayon.  From the mills’ perspective, the relevant price 
is the price per unit of useable fiber.  This is taken into account by adjusting prices so that the price per unit of 
useable fiber is being compared instead of the price of fiber (cotton price is divided by 0.9, while polyester and rayon 
prices are divided by 0.96).   
  13demand model, data on income were derived from monthly data on total personal disposable income for 
the U.S. taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database on their web site (FRED, 
2001).  For export demand, the income variable was foreign gross domestic product (GDP), proxied by 
GDP for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries after subtracting 
U.S. GDP from the total.16  These data were available from various issues of Quarterly National Accounts 
and National Accounts of OECD Countries, but monthly values were interpolated from the available 
quarterly data by fitting a cubic spline to the data using PROC EXPAND in SAS.  A similar procedure 
was used to estimate monthly values of the level of foreign cotton stocks based on annual data obtained 
from USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS).   
Annual data from 1975 through 2000 were used to estimate the cotton supply function.  
Production levels were collected from various issues of the annual USDA publication, Cotton and Wool 
Yearbook.  For the annual supply function, the relevant price is the price that producers expect to receive 
when they make their planting decision.  This price determines the quantity that producers will choose to 
supply (subject to random variation due to weather or other factors).  After the planting decision has been 
made, the quantity that will be produced is fairly unresponsive to price because biological factors (e.g., 
optimal planting season) largely prevent supply response in the short run.  
To capture producers’ expectations of the market price, we used the average of the nearby 
December futures prices over the months when most cotton is planted each year, calculated based on 
information from CI’s monthly database.17  These futures prices should reflect all information available to 
growers when they make their planting decision.  An increase in the futures price implies that growers 
expect to receive a higher market price for their crop at harvest.  Other things being equal, a higher 
expected price at planting time should induce growers to plant more cotton, either on land that was 
formerly idle or previously had other crops grown on it.   
                                                      
16In addition, the Czech Republic, Korea, Hungary, and Poland were not included in the series for consistency because 
their data were not included in OECD GDP estimates for the entire period from 1986 through 2000.   
  14However, another important influence on their supply decision is the level of government support 
payment expected, if that payment varies with output.18  Prior to 1996, eligible cotton production was 
guaranteed to receive at least that year’s target price established by the USDA.  Thus, the relevant supply 
price for eligible cotton was the greater of the target price and the expected market price.  Approximately 
85 percent of production received payments under this program (USDA, 1995b).  Therefore, in years 
from 1975 through 1995 when the target price was binding (i.e., target price > market price), the supply 
price used in the economic model was calculated as the weighted average of the target price and the 
expected market price.  In years when the target price was not binding (i.e., target price < market price), 
the supply price was simply set equal to the expected market price.  The FAIR Act of 1996 eliminated 
price supports under the target price program, but kept the LDP program.  The availability of LDP 
payments also influences the supply decisions, but these payments differ from price supports under the 
target price program because they are based on the difference between the loan rate and the AWP and all 
cotton production is eligible.  Thus, in the economic model, the supply price for each year from 1996 
through 2000 was calculated as the expected market price plus the expected LDP payment for that year.  
The expected LDP payment was assumed to equal the loan rate minus the average AWP at planting if the 
loan rate was above the AWP and zero otherwise.  Changes in farm input prices were estimated using the 
index of prices paid by farmers for the series production, interest, taxes, and wage rates obtained from 
various issues of Agricultural Statistics, an annual USDA publication.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
17The available data on cotton futures prices were monthly based on the value at the end of each month.  To represent 
expectations during the planting season, we averaged the futures prices reported for the end of February, the end of 
March, and the end of April.   
18A government program paying a lump sum regardless of output, such as the current AMTA program, should not 
influence planting decisions because it does not change growers’ incentives. 
  15We deflated all data series denominated in dollars using the CPI prior to use in estimation, 
including all promotion and research expenditure data.19  CPI data are available online from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001).  For all of the models, we used the series for all U.S. urban consumers.   
4. Econometric  Estimation 
4.1 Equation  specifications 
Mill-level demand for cotton was modeled as described by (15).  In this specification, per capita 
mill consumption of cotton is a function of the price of cotton, prices of substitute fibers, demand and 
supply shifters of domestically produced textile products, and demand and supply shifters of foreign-
produced textile products.  The demand and supply shifters of foreign-produced textile products represent 
the impact of the price of imported textile products on mill-level demand for cotton.   
The model was estimated in linear form and the following variables were included (the 
corresponding variable name from (15) is included in parentheses): 
MILLUSEt (Qfd
d)  =  U.S. per capita raw cotton used by mills (pounds per person) 
Mi,t  
                                                     
=  monthly dummy variables (Mi =1 for ith month, 0 otherwise) for i =  
  1,...,11 where December is the reference month with its effect  
  represented by the intercept 
PCOTTONt (Pcd)  =  real U.S. raw fiber equivalent price of cotton (cents/lb) 
PPOLYt (Zr)  =  real U.S. raw fiber equivalent price of polyester (cents/lb) 
PRAYONt (Zr)  =  real U.S. raw fiber equivalent price of rayon (cents/lb) 
DTEXWt (Wt)  =  real domestic wage in U.S. textile manufacturing industry ($/hour) 
WPCOTt (Pcf)  =  real A Index of world cotton price (cents/lb) 
DECIt (Wt, Wr)  =  U.S. real energy cost index (1982-84=100) 
DPIt (Zr)  =  U.S. per capita real disposable income ($1,000/person) 
FGDPt (Zr)  =  real GDP of OECD countries, excluding U.S. (billions of $) 
SAGPROMt (Ag)  =  seasonally adjusted CI real promotional expenditures ($) 
 
19Another option for deflating the promotional expenditures would be to use a media cost index.  However, using a 
media cost index implies that the question of interest is the effectiveness of a given quantity of promotion, whereas 
the question we are interested in for this study is the effectiveness of a real dollar of promotion.  The opportunity cost 
of using a dollar for promotion is that it cannot be used for other activities (e.g., nonagricultural research) or returned 
to those paying assessments, so that is the relevant comparison.  Unless the rapid increase in the costs of promotion 
relative to the general price level in recent years has been accompanied by an equal or greater increase in its 
effectiveness relative to other CI activities, the rapid media cost increases may suggest that promotion is becoming 
relatively less attractive over time as the real price of a unit of promotion becomes more expensive.  This point is not 
captured by the use of a media cost index to deflate expenditures.   
  16SAGNARESt (Rt)  =  seasonally adjusted CI real nonagricultural research expenditures ($) 
 
In addition to promotional and nonagricultural research expenditures (SAGPROMt and 
SAGNARESt), other domestic demand shifters in the model include prices of competing fibers (PPOLYt, 
PRAYONt), prices of other factors in textile manufacturing (DTEXWt, DECIt), and per capita real 
disposable income (DPIt).  Proxies for the impact of the price of imports on domestic mill demand 
include foreign income (FGDPt) and the world price of cotton (WPCOTt).  
Our study focused on quantifying the impact of generic promotion and research on demand for 
cotton.  One complication we had to address is the timing of these explanatory variables.  It is important 
to allow for the possibility that their impact on consumption may be more complicated than simply 
affecting consumption contemporaneously (i.e., in the same period that they occur).  That is, the effects of 
promotion and research on demand may be distributed over time.  Unfortunately, economic theory does 
not offer much guidance in determining the appropriate value for the number of periods that these effects 
continue, m.  Thus, it is necessary to consider alternative lag lengths for both advertising and research to 
determine the “best” lag structure.  With the correct lag length m* unknown, the number of regressors 
that must be included in the model is also unknown.  If the researcher chooses an m other than m* 
(m ≠  m*) the parameter estimates of the model will either be biased or inefficient (imprecise).  It will be 
biased if m < m* because there are omitted variables, but it is inefficient if m > m* due to 
overspecification of the model.   
Thus, we embarked on grid search procedures for several types of distributed lag models (e.g., 
polynomial distributed lag, geometric lag) in an attempt to find the best model (see Murray et al. (2001) 
for details on the grid search).  In all cases of model selection across alternative specifications, we relied 
on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), the Schwartz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC), the adjusted R
2 value 
and the implied estimated economic effects (elasticities) to compare competing models and arrive at a 
preferred model.  Given the economic and statistical considerations as a whole, we arrived at a relatively 
simple model with a 3-month lag on research, no lags on promotion, and no lags on cotton price.  The 
  17long-run impacts of promotion and research are not too different in this model than in models with longer 
lag lengths, and this model has superior performance from a theoretical standpoint (e.g., expected sign for 
variables).  
The export demand for U.S. cotton is specified as a partially reduced-form equation given by (16) 
in which exports of U.S. cotton are modeled as a function of the price of domestic cotton, prices of 
substitute fibers, and demand and supply shifters of foreign-produced textile products.20  The relevant 
information provided by the export demand equation is the price elasticities of export demand with 
respect to the price of U.S. cotton and the world cotton price.   
The model was estimated in linear form21 using the following variables (the corresponding 
variable name from (16) is included in parentheses): 
Mi,t  =  monthly dummy variables (Mi=1 for ith month, 0 otherwise) for  
  i=1,...,11 where December is the reference month 
EXPORTSt (Qfx
d)  =  U.S. exports of raw cotton (thousands of bales) 
PCOTTONt (Pcd)  =  U.S. real raw fiber equivalent price of cotton (cents/lb) 
PPOLYt (Zr)  =  U.S. real raw fiber equivalent price of polyester (cents/lb) 
FTEXWAGEt (Wm)  =  real foreign manufacturing wage ($/hour) 
WPCOTTONt (Pcf)  =  real A Index of the world cotton price (cents/lb) 
DECIt (Wm)  =  U.S. real energy cost index, used as a proxy for foreign energy costs 
FGDPt (Zx)  =  foreign real GDP for OECD countries other than U.S. (billions of $) 
ROWSTKt (Zx)  =  foreign cotton stocks (pounds) 
EXPORTSt-1 (Qfx
d)  =  lagged U.S. exports of raw cotton (thousands of bales) 
rho  =  first-order autocorrelation parameter value 
 
The foreign supply and demand shifters included in the model include prices of competing fibers 
in the foreign fiber market (PPOLYt, WPCOTTONt), prices of other factors affecting foreign textile 
manufacturing demand for U.S. cotton (FTEXWAGEt, DECIt, ROWSTKt), and foreign income (FGDPt).  
                                                      
20In addition, we estimated a variety of specifications including promotion and nonagricultural research.  However, 
neither seems to have a significant effect on export demand in our preferred model.  Thus, in this paper, we focus on 
the effects of the CRPP on domestic demand and exclude the impacts on exports. 
21Other specifications were also estimated, including double-log and semi-log models, but the linear model cannot be 
rejected based on the results from any of the models that we estimated.  In other words, the linear model is at least as 
good as any alternative models that we tried.  Therefore, we chose to use the linear model because it is relatively 
simple.   
  18The real exchange rate, promotion, and nonagricultural research were initially included as well, but 
inclusion of these variables did not lead to significant improvement in the model.  It appears that 
WPCOTTONt is a much better indicator of export demand for cotton than a more general exchange rate.   
The domestic supply of raw U.S. cotton was modeled at the annual level because the planting 
decision is made on an annual basis.  Although there may be some response of production to changes in 
price after planting (e.g., higher abandonment at low price), it is likely to be relatively small.  The supply 
function is based on a simplified version of (17).  It is modeled as a function of expected cotton price, an 
index of farm input prices lagged one year, and a trend variable (to capture technical change).  A linear 
model was estimated incorporating the following variables (the corresponding variable name from (17) is 
included in parentheses): 
PRODt (Qfd
s)  =  annual U.S. cotton production (thousands of bales) 
FPCOTTONt (EPcd)  =  real cotton futures price averaged over planting months (cents/lb) 
PINPUTt-1 (Wf)  =  index of real prices paid by farmers for inputs 
TRENDt (Ra)  =  trend variable that indexes years, increasing from 1 in 1975 to 26  
 in  200022 
 
More complex specifications were considered,23 but the data currently available are inadequate to 
allow much complexity beyond the current model.  For instance, the data series is not long enough to 
permit inclusion of additional variables that may influence supply (e.g., agricultural research, labor 
productivity, returns to alternative crops) while maintaining sufficient degrees of freedom, especially 
given the long lags expected on agricultural research.   
                                                      
22A trend variable was included as a proxy for the effects of agricultural research due to the difficulty in estimating a 
robust specification as a function of agricultural research directly.  The trend variable will provide an upper bound 
on the supply shift caused by agricultural research because it also captures other factors that may increase supply 
over time.   
23For example, we estimated models that included CI agricultural research expenditures; total cotton agricultural 
expenditures (including USDA, the State Agricultural Experiment Stations [SAES], and other nongovernmental 
organizations such as CI); cumulative research at a variety of depreciation rates; and other variants on research 
expenditures.  In addition, we attempted to estimate production functions and to relate yield and production costs to 
cotton agricultural research independently.   
  194.2 Estimation  Results 
The statistical results for the preferred models for domestic and export demand are shown in 
Table 1.  Domestic demand was estimated using 2SLS because of the endogeneity of the price of cotton.  
Because first-order autocorrelation in the residuals was found, 2SLS was applied with correction for first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals using the two-step procedure developed by Hatanaka (1976).  
Overall, the results seem quite reasonable and suggest a strong and significant impact of promotion and 
research on mill consumption of cotton.  There is significant seasonality in mill consumption as indicated 
by highly significant monthly dummy variables (not included in table).  The own-price elasticity of 
Table 1.  Regression Results for Monthly Demand for U.S. Cotton, 1986-2000 
Domestic Demand  Export Demand 
2SLS and First-Order 
Autocorrelation 
2SLS and First-Order 
Autocorrelation  Independent 
Variable  Para-meters t-values  Elasticity
Independent 
Variable  Parameters  t-values  Elasticity 
CONSTANTt  1.75181  2.07    CONSTANTt  338.440  0.77   
PCOTTONt  –0.01089  –3.21  –0.413  EXPORTSt-1  0.601  9.27  0.601 
PPOLYt  –0.00361  –1.65  –0.129  PCOTTONt  –6.757  –1.98  –0.692 
PRAYONt  0.00261  1.50  0.137  PPOLYt  0.748  0.31  0.072 
DTEXWAGEt  –0.13169  –0.87  –0.453  WPCOTTONt  7.266  2.23  0.732 
WPCOTTONt  0.01264  4.08  0.427  DECIt  –0.389  –0.13  –0.037 
DECIt  –0.00723  –2.14  –0.256  FGDPt  0.016  0.52  0.211 
DPIt  –67879.7  –0.87  –0.616  ROWSTKt  –3.790E-09  –0.57  –0.103 
FGDPt  0.000061  0.79  0.309         
SAGPROMt  2.12E-08  2.00  0.023         
SAGNARESt  5.12E-07  4.72  0.152         
SAGNARESt-1  7.30E-08  0.68  0.022         
SAGNARESt-2  2.79E-07  2.75  0.083         
SAGNARESt-3  3.16E-07  3.06  0.094         
rho  0.19303  2.62    rho  0.07600  –0.53   
N  176      N  178     
R2  0.7990      R2  0.7540     
2  0.7671      2  0.7290     
DW  2.0318      DW  1.8939     
R R
 
  20demand for cotton is –0.4, which is close to estimates of about –0.3 by Lowenstein (1952), Wohlgenant 
(1986), and Waugh (1964) and in the range between Shui, Behgin, and Wohlgenant (1993), which found 
an elasticity of –0.6 and Capps et al. (1997), which estimated an elasticity of –0.16.  
The world price of cotton also has a large and significant effect on cotton mill use.  This variable 
is a strong indicator of the cost of imported cotton textile products.  Higher world cotton prices raise the 
cost of producing cotton in foreign countries, which translates into higher prices of cotton products 
imported and higher U.S. mill consumption of cotton.  It is important also to recognize that, because the 
U.S. is not a small country in international trade of cotton, feedback effects may exist from changes in the 
U.S. cotton price on the world cotton price.  Therefore, the effect is included in simulations of the impact 
of promotion and research on returns to cotton producers this feedback effect needs to be considered. 
The elasticity of promotion is estimated to be 0.023 and the long-run elasticity estimates of mill 
consumption with respect to research (the sum of current and lagged effects) is 0.35.  These elasticities 
imply that a 10 percent increase in promotion expenditure would lead to a 0.23 percent increase in cotton 
demand, while a 10 percent increase in nonagricultural research expenditures would lead to a 3.5 percent 
increase in cotton demand.   
The results for the preferred model24 for export demand provided in Table 1 conform with other 
studies of the cotton market.  There is significant seasonality to U.S. cotton exports as indicated by highly 
significant monthly dummy variables (not included in table), although the seasonal pattern of exports is 
quite different from that of mill consumption.  The export demand price elasticity for cotton is about –0.7, 
which is just below the lower end of the range estimated for the export demand elasticity by Duffy, 
Wohlgenant, and Richardson (1990) and is more elastic than domestic demand, as trade theory would 
suggest.  The effect of lagged exports is highly significant.  It seems that the major factors contributing to 
export demand are the domestic cotton price, the world cotton price, seasonality, and partial adjustment of 
exports over time to these and other unobserved trade shocks, with none of the other variables having a 
                                                      
24An LM test (used because of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable) reveals the presence of autocorrelation, so a 
first-order autocorrelation correction was included in the model.   
  21very important role.  The price elasticity for the world price of cotton is around 0.7, suggesting that 
foreign cotton and U.S. cotton are substitutes for one another, and that U.S. export demand is fairly 
sensitive to the world cotton price.   
Although a relatively simple model, the results of the supply equation estimation appear 
reasonable in terms of the estimated supply elasticity and the signs of the parameters.  Table 2 provides 
the results of the estimation for the model estimated with OLS both with and without the input price 
index.  The trend term is very significant when the farm input price index is not included in the model.  
Once the input price is added to the specification, the trend variable becomes much smaller in magnitude 
and is no longer significant.  This suggests that an important part of the outward supply shifts over time 
being captured by the trend variable is due to reductions in input costs.  Due to difficulties in separating 
out the impacts of CI expenditures on supply shifts over time, the primary use of the supply model is to 
obtain econometric estimates of the supply elasticity, rather than to estimate the supply side impacts of 
the CRPP.   
Table 2.  Regression Results for Annual Supply of U.S. Cotton, 1975-2000 
OLS without Input Price Index  OLS with Input Price Index 
Independent 
Variable  Parameters  t-values  Elasticity  Parameters  t-values  Elasticity 
CONSTANTt  432.3066  0.10    18,957.7  1.49   
FPCOTTONt  94.7157  2.31  0.454  103.8293  2.21  0.498 
TRENDt  546.6276  4.66  0.038  301.9883  1.43  0.021 
PINDEXt-1        –190.0750  –1.61  –1.099 
N  26      25     
R2  0.6092      0.5952     
R2-bar  0.5752      0.5374     
DW  2.2059      2.3368     
SSE  1.04× 108      9.31× 107    
 
There was no evidence of significant autocorrelation for either model.  The price elasticity of 
supply is about 0.45 for the model without the input price index and 0.49 in the model including that 
  22index, which is in the range of supply elasticities in the literature.  Duffy and Wohlgenant (1991) use a 
short-run supply elasticity for cotton of 0.3, and Duffy, Shalishali, and Kinnucan (1994) report a value of 
0.92 for the cotton supply elasticity.   
5.  Simulation of Interaction Effects 
The econometric results presented in the previous section allow us to estimate the change in the 
price and quantity of cotton that has resulted from CRPP expenditures.  To simulate the market with a 
marginal increase in CRPP expenditures, we simply increase those expenditures by 1 percent and observe 
what the supply and demand responses would look like.  The simulated equilibrium provides the 
information necessary to calculate the return on investment (ROI) for producers.   
To measure the effect of the CRPP on domestic producers in the absence of distortions from the 
LDP and Step 2 programs, the proportionate change in price expected to result from a marginal change in 
CRPP expenditures was simulated using 
  EP s
cd = 
s1b1EA + s1b2ENAR
e – s1(η  + η fdη f) – (1–s1)(η x + η fdη f)
   (18) 
where E in front of a variable denotes a proportional change in that variable; s1 is the share of domestic 
cotton production sold domestically; e is the estimated supply elasticity; η  is the estimated domestic 
demand elasticity; η x is the estimated export demand elasticity; η fd is the estimated elasticity of price 
transmission between U.S. and foreign cotton prices; η f is the estimated elasticity of U.S. mill 
consumption with respect to the foreign cotton price; η xf is the estimated elasticity of export demand with 
respect to the foreign cotton price; PS is the effective price received by domestic producers;25 A is 
promotional expenditures; NAR is nonagricultural research expenditures; and β 1 and β 2 are the domestic 
promotion and nonagricultural research elasticities, respectively.  For more details on the derivation of 
this equation, see Murray et al. (2001).    
                                                      
25Note that this price is generally not the same as the price paid by demanders because of gaps created by the 
assessment, by U.S. government subsidies to buyers of U.S. cotton, and by government support payments to 
producers. 
  23Given the change in price estimated using (18), the change in producer surplus can be calculated 
by the following equation: 
  ∆ PS = Ps0
cd Qs0
fd EP s





s1(η  + η fdη f) + (1–s1)(η x + η fdη f)
 •  T (19) 
where a subscript of 0 denotes baseline conditions, E denotes a proportionate change in a variable, and T 
is the assessment collected from domestic producers.   
Based on the expression in (18), our estimated parameters, and the average supply price and 
quantity from 1996 through 2000, a 1 percent increase in annual promotional expenditures would have 
resulted in an average price increase of 0.02 percent under free market conditions.  A 1 percent increase in 
annual nonagricultural research expenditures, on the other hand, is estimated to raise cotton prices by 0.30 
percent.  Taken together, these results imply that a 1 percent increase in expenditures on both promotion 
and research would increase cotton prices by 0.32 percent.  The increase in quantity given an estimated 
increase in price is calculated by multiplying the proportionate increase in price found using (18) by the 
estimated supply elasticity.  The proportionate changes in quantity implied by a 1 percent increase in 
annual promotional expenditures, annual nonagricultural research expenditures, and total demand-side 
expenditures are 0.01 percent, 0.14 percent, and 0.15 percent, respectively.   
Using the simulated changes in price and quantity resulting from CRPP activities, estimated 
parameters, and the average values of price and quantity from 1996 through 2000, we calculated net 
changes in producer surplus over that period using (19).  This net change in producer surplus was then 
divided by the change in assessment paid by domestic producers for calculating the ROI.   
In addition to calculating the ROI assuming a free market, we also examined the effects on the 
returns to the CRPP under several variations of government cotton support programs.  Table 3 shows the 
estimated ROI under different government programs as well as a weighted ROI measure based on the 
number of months each was in effect during 1996 through 2000.  These results show that when the Step 2 
program is in effect, there is a significantly larger benefit of promotion and research to producers.  This is 
because the effective price faced by consumers of raw cotton (primarily foreign and domestic textile  
  24Table 3.  Effects of Interaction with Government Cotton Programs on Domestic Producer ROI, 
1996-2000 (2000$) 
Marginal Benefits, Costsa  Free Market  LDP  Step 2 




Net Producer Benefits, 
Promotion 
$1,339,915 $1,065,155 $2,081,637 $1,473,021 $1,611,416 
Net Producer Benefits, Non 
Ag Research 
$18,871,694 $15,365,473 $28,341,000 $20,570,558 $22,337,780 
Net Producer Benefits, 
Combined 
$20,166,529 $16,384,866 $30,380,092 $21,998,879 $23,905,031 
Domestic Producer Costs, 
Promotion 
$290,084 $290,084 $290,084 $290,084 $290,084 
Domestic Producer Costs, Non 
Ag Research 
$67,334 $67,334 $67,334 $67,334 $67,334 
Domestic Producer 
Assessment, Combined 
$453,447 $453,447 $453,447 $453,447 $453,447 
Producer Benefits/Producer 
Costs, Promotion 
4.6 3.7 7.2 5.1 5.6 
Producer Benefits/Producer 
Costs, Non Ag Research 
280.3 228.2 420.9 305.5 331.7 
Producer Benefits/Producer 
Assessments, Combined 
44.5 36.1 67.0 48.5 52.7 
aThese values correspond to a 1 percent increase in expenditures and costs/assessments.  For promotion and research the costs to 
domestic producers of a marginal increase in CRPP expenditures are calculated as 1 percent of the expenditures on those 
activities multiplied by the share of total assessments paid by domestic producers (about 67 percent).  For the combined 
measure, the costs are calculated as a 1 percent increase in the total assessments paid by domestic producers. 
bWeights for the four policy regimes are based on the number of months each was in effect during 1996-2000. 
mills) does not increase as much as it would in a free market.  When demand shifts out, the market price 
will rise.  However, this will trigger larger government subsidies per pound of cotton.  The net price after 
subsidy will rise much less than the price received by producers as a result of these payments.  Thus, the 
quantity purchased and the price received by producers both increase more than they would under free 
market conditions.  The LDP program, on the other hand, acts to reduce the ROI of promotion and 
nonagricultural research activities when binding.  This is because part of the increase in market price 
isoffset by reductions in government LDP payments.  A weighted average of the returns under different 
government programs in existence from 1996 through 2000 yields a return that is about 18 percent higher 
than the estimated return in the absence of government programs. 
  256.  Summary and Conclusions 
Using an econometrically estimated model of the U.S. cotton market, we find that interaction 
effects with existing government cotton programs have a large impact on checkoff program returns.  Our 
simulation results show that the returns to the CRPP are reduced by about 20 percent when only the loan 
rate for the LDP is binding and increased by just over 50 percent when only the Step 2 program is in 
effect.  The net effects of these programs when both are in effect at the same time may be either positive 
or negative depending on U.S. cotton prices, world cotton prices, the loan rate, and other variables that 
influence government subsidy payments and the cotton market. 
One policy implication of these findings is that producers of commodities that receive statutorily 
required support (feed grains (corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats); cotton; rice; wheat; peanuts; sugar; 
tobacco; soybeans; minor oilseeds (sunflower seed, canola, rapeseed, safflower, mustard seed, flax seed); 
and dairy products) may have a reduced incentive to establish generic promotion and research programs if 
some of their support is in the form of nonrecourse loans and LDPs.  In fact, relatively few of these 
commodities have established promotion and research programs.  Only soybeans, cotton, peanuts, and 
dairy products have national checkoff programs and three of the four have unique features of their support 
programs in addition to LDPs that make checkoff programs that increase commodity demand more 
attractive (e.g., Step 2 demand subsidies for cotton, quotas on the quantity of peanuts that can be 
marketed for domestic edible use, and a system that offers premiums to dairy producers for shifting more 
production into Class I (fluid milk)).26  To the extent that checkoff programs are more efficient than 
federal commodity support programs, there may be net benefits to altering the support system to 
encourage formation of generic promotion and research programs for additional commodities receiving 
the majority of Federal commodity support funds.  
                                                      
26In addition, the loan rate for soybeans was very rarely binding prior to 1998, implying that nonrecourse loans and 
LDPs have had little effect on soybean producers’ behavior until the last few years. 
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